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We  express  a  doubt  on  the  conventional  wisdom  namely,  of  a  positive  relationship 
between wage and productivity, of a formal sector firm in a developing economy where 
the firm can either go for subcontracting to the informal sector to minimize wage cost 
along  with  apprehension  of  extra-legal  cost  and/or  investment  in  R&D  for  in-house 
production. We show that a rise of the formal wage does not necessarily ensure higher 
R&D and labour-productivity of the formal firm while a rise of the informal sector wage 
must improve R&D and the resultant labour-productivity in the firm. Thus countries with 
a vast segment of lowly-paid informal workers will also exhibit lowly-productive formal 
sector workers.  
Key  words:  Informal  Wage,  Poverty,  Labour  Productivity,  R&D  Investment, 
Outsourcing 
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1.  Introduction 
It is understood that the ability of firms to avoid minimum wage laws, certain 
types of taxes and the livelihood needs for a vast majority of population leads to the 
formation of the unorganized sector whose significance can hardly be undermined if one 
is seriously interested in understanding the working of a typical developing economy. In 
the developing world 80-90% of the workforce is in the informal manufacturing sector 
that  has  direct  or  indirect  production  linkages  to  the  formal  producer  and  one  such 
linkage  is  through  subcontracting.  Almost  90%  of  workforce  in  India  is  in  the 
unorganized sector. An issue of particular concern is how informal workers can face the 
challenge of globalization posed by liberal policies of a reforming economy. Goldberg 
and Pavnick (2003) and Marjit, Biswas, and Ghosh (2007) argue that liberal trade and 
investment  policies  may  expand  or  contract  output  and  employment  in  the  informal 
sector.  Marjit,  Biswas  and  Ghosh  (2007)  argue  that  if  liberal  trade  policies  lead  to 
increased profitability, more output is likely to be produced in the formal segment. Marjit 
(2003) and Marjit, Kar and Beladi (2007) show that even if workers are laid off in the 
formal sector and fall upon casual jobs, informal wage and employment can still go up 
provided capital can be relocated easily from the formal to the informal sector. Several 
papers  in  Guha-Khasnobis  and  Kanbur  (ed.,  2006)  analyse  the  state  of  informal 
enterprises  in  the  developing  world.  It  is  more  or  less  recognized  and  it  should  be 
universally accepted that the informal sector often survives on account of outsourcing by 
the formal sector.  
There have been a few popular arguments for the existence and proliferation of 
the informal sector. One argument suggests that the informal transaction takes place in   4 
order to bypass trade union activities in the formal sector (Basely and Burgess, 2004). 
Another view relates to the governance system of a state/country. The government of a 
development economy strategically chooses ‘weak governance’ and allows ‘extra-legal’ 
transaction to take place in a bid to tackle poverty and unemployment as also to lessen the 
possibility of social unrest (Marjit et al., 2007). In other words, the governance system 
will be effectively weak and will allow informal transaction to flourish in the presence of 
high poverty. As a result, a variety of low cost goods and services, which requires a little 
investment  but  provide  employment  to  a  large  number  of  uneducated  and  otherwise 
jobless  people,  thrive  in  the  informal  sector.  As  a  corollary,  we  argue  that  if  the 
government allows ‘extra-legal’ activities in the informal sector at a low wage, a formal 
producer taking advantage of that will not go for more in-house production by cutting 
down  R&D  investment.  This,  in  turn,  would  act  as  a  binding  condition  for  the 
productivity improvement of formal workers. As a result, a high correlation would hardly 
be observed between wage and productivity in a formal sector firm rather a correlation 
between  informal  wage  and  formal  labour  productivity  must  be  apparent.  This  paper 
develops a framework to show this and also provides some empirical evidences from 
India. We develop our argument in detail in the next section. 
We build on the framework of Marjit et al. (2007) to argue that lower wage in the 
informal  segment  hurts  the  productivity  of  the  formal  sector  worker.  The  poorer  a 
society, the lower is the informal wage likely to be and we argue that this may have a 
negative productivity impact. Usually in the efficiency wage models, which talk about the 
positive effect of a higher wage (Shapiro and Stigliz, 1984; Banerji and Gupta, 1998), 
there is direct nutritional incentive effect of higher wage. Hence, a decline in wage does   5 
lead to declining productivity and the entrepreneurs might be reluctant to reduce the wage 
rate  even in the face of unemployment. That is the key  argument explaining the co-
existence of unemployment and rigid wage. What we argue is different. A lower wage in 
the informal segment acts as a disincentive to go for productivity improvement efforts on 
the part of the formal sector entrepreneurs. Thus, a poor economy or an economy with 
substantially poor people will also be an economy where organized sector workers will 
be less productive. This shows that when a society has a lot of poor unorganized workers; 
those  who  are  fortunate  enough  to  obtain  relatively  high-wage  jobs  may  not  be  as 
productive as they would be in a society where access to the low wage informal segment 
is banned or severely restricted. This will also mean that if two firms in two different 
countries face different institutional climate – i.e., one may not have any access to the 
unorganized workers either because there are none or because it is too costly to access 
extra  legal  means  and  the  other  faces  a  much  more  lack  lustre  environment,  the 
institutionally  more  constrained  one  will  have  more  productive  workers.  It  is  well 
recognized that formal  sector jobs pay higher  wage to a typical worker than what is 
usually  offered  in  informal  enterprises.  Agenor  (1996)  and  the  paper  cited  therein 
corroborates such claims. Branson, Woodruff and Marcouiller (1997) have contradictory 
evidence for Mexico while reconfirming the wage gap for El Salvador and Peru. Earlier 
theoretical model of Carruth and Oswald (1981) and later by Esfahani and Salehi-Isfahani 
(1989)  provide  justifications  of  economic  dualism  between  a  unionized  and  non-
unionized  sector.  The  later  paper  uses  effort  observality  and  worker  productivity  as 
possible reasons responsible for wage-premium in the formal sector.   6 
We start from a set-up with a given wage premium in the formal sector due to 
more active unionism. A formal-informal division easily occurs along the line of high-
low wage. Typically a firm, facing an organized union and stringent labour laws, looks 
for workers who can be hired at lower than minimum wages without the promise of other 
fringe benefits. Such casual contracts are ‘illegal’, but firms can avoid punishment by 
increasing cost to influence the monitors. Such a system survives because poor people 
need  jobs  and  the  governance  system  turns  out  to  be  corrupt  and  reasonably  weak. 
Dasgupta  and  Marjit  (2006)  and  Marjit,  Mukherjee  and  Kolmar  (2006)  argue  that 
‘informal’  sector  may  be  the  outcome  of  a  deliberate  strategy  on  the  part  of  the 
government in a poor country either to exert pressure on trade unions and/or to avoid 
social unrest in the absence of a well designed and funded social welfare programme for 
the poor. 
The  existence  of  an  informal  sector  allows  some  degree  of  labour  market 
flexibility even at the cost of encouraging an environment where people are employed at 
a  low  wage  and  under  poor  working  conditions.  Social  concern  for  workers  in  a 
disgraceful work environment will still concede the fact that without jobs the workers 
would be definitely worse off. The recent empirical evidence on wages in the informal 
manufacturing sector in India shows that real informal wages have been on the rise across 
states even in a situation when the organized sector has been lamenting jobless growth. 
This is available in Marjit and Maiti (2006). However, the existence of a low wage sector 
acts as if the firms have access to a low cost technology when they have to pay a higher 
wage to the formal workers. This reduces the incentive to search for a low cost alternative 
in the formal sector and eventually leads to a lower amount of productivity-augmenting   7 
R&D  expenditure.  This  in  turn  affects  the  average  labour  productivity  in  the  formal 
sector. If our conjecture is right ceteris paribus, lower informal wage should imply lower 
productivity  of  formal  sector  workers.  Since  lower  wage  in  the  informal  sector  is 
generally  reflective  of  labour  productivity  in  the  informal  sector,  improving  labour 
productivity in the informal sector should lead to an improvement in the formal sector 
productivity as well.  
We received some motivating results from the Indian economy. The database for 
such a study relating to informal sector is very poor in India. As per the Indian Factory 
Act, 1948, the firm that employs 10  workers or more with power and  more than 20 
without power can be described as an organized or formal sector unit. The Annual Survey 
of Industries (ASI), Government of India compiles detailed information of those firms on 
a regular basis. The firms that are not covered by the ASI, fall under the unorganized or 
informal sector. The information on those firms is procured by National Sample Survey 
Organization (NSSO), Government of India through the stratified random sample survey 
every five years since 1978-79. Those reports documented the extent of informality and it 
is noticeable that maintenance of registration, accounts and payments to labour is hardly 
observed as per industrial and labour laws. However, wage information is covered since 
1989-90 and we find this information for three discrete time periods (i.e., 1989-90, 1994-
95  and  2000-01).  Firms,  hiring  more  than  five  workers,  are  defined  as  directory 
manufacturing  establishments  (DME).  Non-directory  manufacturing  establishments 
(NDME) and own-account manufacturing establishments (OAME) are those who hire 1-5 
workers  and  do  not  hire  workers,  respectively.  The  present  study  considers  annual 
emoluments of hired workers in NDME as informal wage and the annual emoluments of   8 
factory workers as formal wage at 1993-94 prices. It should be noted that formal wage is 
on an average 2 to 6 times higher than the informal wage and this gap varies across 
regions over time.  
Let  us  move  to  the  analysis  of  wage  and  productivity.  Given  this  limited 
observation, we run separately pooled OLS regression with state and time dummies and 
panel  GLS  regressions  to  estimate  the  relationship  between  informal  wage-formal 
productivity  and  formal  wage–formal  productivity  keeping  the  control  variable  as 
minimum as possible. While doing this, the regional openness index
1 ( it O ) is taken as a 
control  variable  (Marjit  et  al.,  2007).  The  way  it  has  been  constructed,  all  sorts  of 
restrictions  on  factors  including  factor  mobility,  investment  climate  and  resource 
abundance across, labour rigidity at the state level have been captured. However, one can 
take those state specific variables into the regression model, but it will consume certain 
degree of freedom. 
Before presenting the regression results, the simple correlations reported in Table 
1 reveal an interesting trend. While the correlation coefficient between formal wage and 
formal productivity weakens from 1989-90 to 2000-01, it seems to be gradually stronger 
between informal wage and formal productivity. Productivity is measured as simply gross 
value added per workers.  
Let us move to the regression results. We regress separately formal wage and 
informal wage on formal labour productivity using pooled OLS and GLS panel models. 
The regression coefficient between formal wage and formal productivity is not significant 
                                                 
1 Openness index ( it O ) of i-th state at t-th period is weighted average of export and import intensities for 
the state. These intensities are ranks of the state on correlation of its production share at the 2-digit industry 
level with the country’s export and import shares of these industries.     9 
in the OLS pooled model controlling for all the states and years, while it is more-or-less 
significant between the formal labour productivity and informal wage at the 10% level.  
Similar  results  also  appear  in  the  GLS  panel  regression  (Table  2).  The  regression 
coefficients between informal wage and formal productivity come out as significant the 
1% level, but not between formal wage and formal productivity. These results essentially 
suggest  that  formal  productivity  is  highly  influenced  by  the  informal  wage  which  is 
market determined. The formal wage may not influence its productivity to the extent that 
the informal wage does. The rest of the chapters are as follows. Section III proposes the 
model and the last section concludes. 
Section II: The Model 
Suppose a firm produces a good X, which can be produced by using organized or 
formal workers. These workers earn a pre-determined negotiated wage rate  1 w  and/or by 
accessing  informal  units  which  employ  labour  at  a  wage  rate  1 2 w w < .  While  in  the 
absence of any noticeable productivity gap, the firm will be inclined to hire only informal 
workers, there are other kinds of costs. Hiring informal workers is not legal. Therefore, 
there  are  potential  regulatory  problems  faced  by  the  firm.  We  model  the 
auditing/monitoring/bribery issues explicitly for a producer who outsources X2 amount of 
X to the informal sector. In a true sense it is ‘illegal’ because of its violation of existing 
industrial and labour laws and hence calls for bribe from the industrial officers who are 
reasonably corrupts. If a firm subcontracts to the informal sector, the probability of being 
detected  and  fined  will  be  apprehended  and  the  probability  depends  on  the  size  of 
informal  employment.  In  our  model,  the  probability  of  being  detected  is  given  by 
) ; ( 2 g L p with  0 > ′ p and 0 > ′ ′ p . In other words, the probability of getting caught will be   10 
less if the size of informal employment is low given a level of governance. In the case of 
strong  governance,  g g =   and  ) ( ) ; ( 2 2 L p g L p = .  While  in  case  of  weak  governance, 
g g =   and ) ( ) ; ( 2 2 L p g L p = .  If  g g g ≤ ≤ ,  then  ) ( ) ; ( ) ( 2 2 2 L p g L p L p ≤ ≤ .  If  the  firm 
hires  2 L , the cost would be – wage bills for informal wage  ) ( 2 2L w and the amount of 
bribes  given  to  the  industrial  officers  as  a  percentage  of  the  value  of  informal 
employment  ) ( 2 2L bw . In total this is as follows:  ( ) 2 2 1 L w pb C + =  where b is the bribe or 
punishment cost set by the government as a percentage of value of informal employment. 
Then, one can write,  ( ) ) , ; ( ) ( 1 2 2 2 2 2 b g X c w X w b X p C = + = .      (1) 
Now,  ( ) 0 1 2 > ′ + + = ′ X p b pb c  and  0 2 2 > ′ ′ + ′ = ′ ′ X p b p b c  
Marginal Cost for  ) ( 2 2 2 X c w X ′ = . The basic intuition is that the larger is the size of the 
informal  segment,  greater  the  threats  inviting  regulators.  We  allow  for  labour 
productivity augmenting expenditure F only in the formal sector which can be thought of 
as a technology that reduces the marginal cost of production. It is possible that such a 
venture will be difficult to set up in an extra-legal segment. Also as we shall see later that 
even if the firm can potentially promote such initiative in the informal segment, it might 
not be optimal for the firm to do so if  2 w  is really low. Now in order to optimize surplus 
a  firm  faces  a  trade-off  –  either  an  increase  of  R&D  for  in-house  production  or 
outsourcing to low paid informal workers, or both.  If R(X1 + X2) is the standard revenue 
function facing the firm, the firm’s optimization problem looks as follows: 
Max ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( 2 2 1 1 2 1
, , 2 1
F Z X c w X F w X X R
F X X
− − − + = α π     (2) 
To produce one unit of X (or X1) in the formal sector  ) (F α  unit of labour is required. 
Z(F) is a kind of R&D cost. We assume that the decision on F is taken first and then on   11 
X1 and X2 and those can be solved by the backward induction method. The following 
curvature restrictions are assumed: 
2 1 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 , 0 X X X c c c Z Z R R + = = ′ ′ ′ > ′ ′ > ′ > ′ ′ > ′ > ′ ′ < ′ < ′ ′ > ′ α α  
We are not really interested in finding a solution to the level of governance. But in case 
of  strong  governance,  g g = and  b b = ,  then  π π π = = ) , ( 1 F X .  In  case  of  the  weak 
governance,  g g = and  b b = , then  π π π = = ) ( 2 X . If π π π > > , there exists a solution 
of a set of  F X X , , 2 1 where g g g < < and  b b b < < . 
From (2) the first order conditions are 




/ X c w R = .              (4) 
' ' 1 1 Z X w = − α .              (5) 
While solving for ) , ( 2 1 X X , F is taken as given. Then we internalize that in equation (5) 
to determine optimal F. (see Appendix) 
From (3) and (4), 
) ( ) ( 2 2 1 X c w F w ′ = α .              (6) 
Let   ) / ) ( ( ) / ) ( (
~
2 1 2 1
1 w F w f w F w c X α α = ′ =
−   .        (7) 
Check  that  for X X
~
< ,  the  firm  will  not  employ  any  formal  worker  as 
) ( ) ( 2 2 1 X c w F w ′ > α .  If  X X
~
> ,  X X
~
− must  be  produced  in  the  formal  sector  as 
) ( ' ) ( 2 2 1 X c w F w < α  for  X X
~
> . We assume that the size of the market is large enough to 
accommodate both in-house production as well as outsourcing (Fig. 1). Technically, this 
implies a  X such that,    12 
) ( ) ( 1 F w X R α = ′ .              (8) 
With  X X
~
> . 
This also implies that if the market size is not large enough only informal workers will be 
hired. Therefore, the firm will outsource  2
~
X X = units to the informal sector and produce 
)
~
( X X − in-house. Note that in presence of good governance, the probability of being 
caught  by  the  industrial  officer  and/or  the  punishment  cost  will  be  higher  and  the 
) ( 2 2 X c w ′ curve will be shifted upward. As a result,  2 X will shrink and  1 X will rise. 
Figure 1: Allocation of formal-informal production (given F) 
 
Note that these solutions are derived for a given value of F. We are following a backward 
induction method by which  X and  X
~
are solved as functions of F, then  1 )
~
( X X X = −  is 
substituted in (8) to solve for F. 
X  X   X
~
  O 







) ( 1 F wα  
 
 
2 w  
) ( 2 2 X c w ′  
) ( 1 F wα  
R′ 
1 X   2 X    13 
Since  ) (F α denotes the inverse of labour productivity in the formal sector, our task is to 
check how F responds to changes in  1 w and  2 w - the formal and informal wage rate. 
Rewriting and assuming F
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α   ,          (10) 
Where  0 1 1 < ′ ′ − ′ ′ − =   Z X w α (by the second order condition guaranteeing the optimality 
of F
*). 
Now,  ) ( ) ( 1 F w X R α = ′ ,              (11) 
Given  0 < ′ ′ R ,  )) ( ( 1 F w X α φ =   with  0 < ′ φ         (12) 
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Hence, from (9) and (10), we can write 













































α               (17) 
Therefore, we can write down the following propositions:   14 
Proposition I: A rise of informal wage, not formal wage, must improve R&D and labour-
productivity in the formal sector. 





 could be positive or negative depending on the 
conditions  of  the  right-hand  side  of  the  expression.  Therefore,  the  change  in  labour 

























  QED. 
So, the higher wage in formal sector is not highly correlated to the labour productivity of 
the sector. A rise of formal wage has two counteracting effects on F.  It pushes up to go 
for more informal workers cutting down in-house production and F. At the same time, 
expensive labour will be substituted by F. Therefore, the net effect on F and the resultant 
productivity of formal sector workers are ambiguous.  






. Therefore, the change in labour productivity in 

























  QED. 
A  higher  2 w   induces  greater  production  in  the  formal  sector  increasing  the  marginal 




   15 
Labour Market and Wage 
 
Yet we have not considered labour markets for the determination of wages. In this case, 
the stages of the game will be a little different from the earlier one. Here, F and the 
sectoral outputs will be determined respectively, at first and third stage and wages will be 
determined separately in respective labour markets at the second stage. As earlier, the 
objective function of a formal producer is eq. (1) and as per backward induction method, 
sectoral outputs, wages and R&D will be solved, respectively.  
Since the objective function is the same, the optimum output in the formal and 








= =   and 




1 2 1 w
w
f w X X X
α
α φ − = − = .  
We assume that wage in the formal sector is set by the trade union and formal firm takes 
it at w w = 1 . So it is exogenously fixed to the firm. However, the wage can vary across 
the  regions  or  states  depending  upon  the  strength  of  labour  market  institutions  and 
government attitude towards workers, etc. So, the labour employed at the formal sector 







− = = ) ( ) (
2
1
1 1 1 w
w
f w X L
α
α φ α α .            (18) 
Now, the workers, who do not find employment in the formal sector, will crowd into the 
inform sector and labour supply to the informal sector is residual, i.e.,  1 2 X L L
s α − = , 













α .  So,  the  supply  function  of  informal  labour  is  positively 
sloped.    16 
Let us assume that the production for one unit of X2 requires one unit of informal labour, 























. So, the demand function is negatively sloped. Note that the 
absolute value of the slope of supply is less than that of the demand function which is 
precondition  for  the  stability  condition.  The  equilibrium  wage  will  be  determined  by 
equating demand and supply equation as follows: 



















− − . 



















w ,  0 > ′ g as 0 > ′ f .          (20) 
 
Proposition II: Even if we endogenise the informal wage, (i) a rise of formal wage does 
not necessarily influence the informal wage,  (ii) R&D and labour productivity in the 
formal sector firm would not necessarily be positively related to formal wage. 


























.          (21) 
Both the first and second term of (21) is positive and hence the direction is ambiguous. 
Therefore, a rise of formal wage does not necessarily push up the informal wage. The 
basic intuition is that the rise of formal wage influences both supply and demand for 
informal  workers  in  different  directions.  If  the  trade  union  sets  higher 1 w ,  the  formal   17 
sector  firm  will  substitute  formal  for  the  informal  worker  and  demand  for  informal 
workers must  rise. On the other  hand, those workers, who will be  released  from the 
formal sector, will crowd informal sector and increase supply of the informal workers. 
So,  the  relative  strength  of  the  supply  and  demand  for  the  informal  workers  will 
determine the informal wage depending upon the quality of governance, rigidity of trade 
unions and extra-legal cost for hiring informal workers.  
We have already derived  2 w  and in order to derive F, we have to replace  2 w  on (1) using 
(20). Because,  2 w  is now no longer an exogenous variable, rather it is dependent upon 
1 w . Now, our task is to solve F in order to see the effect of wage on it. In stead of solving 









= . The first 
part of right hand side relates the effect of  2 w  on F when  2 w is exogenous and that is 
positive  (see  17).  The  second  part  of  that  relates  the  effect  1 w   on  2 w   and  this  is 





. We can 


























Looking at these results, one can argue that if the formal wage pushes up the  informal 
wage, both R&D and labour productivity in the formal sector can increase and only the 
rise of formal wage does not ensure the increase of R&D and labour productivity of the 
sector. 
   18 
Section III: Concluding Remarks 
This short paper is a follow up to some of the earlier analysis of formal-informal 
interaction when either there is a vertical link between outputs produced in two segments 
or a part of the produce is contracted out to the informal enterprises. Empirically we 
observe  a  high  correlation  between  informal  wage  and  formal  productivity,  but  not 
between formal wage and productivity both in the pooled and panel regressions.  
It is argued that a developing economy with a higher rate of poverty strategically 
chooses ‘weak governance’ to bypass the labour and industrial laws and allows ‘extra-
legal’  transaction  and  a  thriving  informal  sector  in  order  to  tackle  the  poverty  and 
unemployment problem which assuages the possibility of social unrest. If so, we develop 
a framework to argue that, given the level of weak governance and labour market rigidity 
of formal workers, a formal sector firm strategically subcontracts to the informal sector in 
order to minimize wage cost and cut down in-house R&D investment. And, this acts as a 
binding condition of the productivity improvement of formal workers. The higher the 
difference of wages between the two segments the greater will be the subcontracts to the 
informal sector and hence a relatively low informal wage hurts the R&D and resultant 
productivity in the formal sector. In other words, a relatively prosperous informal worker 
raises the amount of output produced in-house within the organized sector. This tends to 
increase labour saving R&D in the formal sector as the operation expands there and we 
have a higher productivity of formal workers. This goes against the conversional belief of 
a positive relationship between wage and productivity of a formal sector firm. One policy 
message can be drawn from this result - if informal wage can be raised, not only it will   19 
promote  the  welfare  of  the  informal  sector  workers  but  it  also  will  promote  the 
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Appendix 
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[X1(F), X2(F)] solve the system given  2 1,w w and other parameters. 
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Yielding (5) in the text. 
Table 
Table 1: Correlation coefficients across major states of India 
Year  Between formal wage 
and formal labour 
productivity  
Between informal wage 
and informal labour 
productivity 
Between informal wage 
and formal labour 
productivity 
1989-90  0.56  0.57  0.17 
1994-95  0.55  0.76  0.49 
2000-01  0.38  0.84  0.55 




th Report) for informal sector data and ASI (Annual Survey of Industries), CSO 
(Central Statistical Organisation) for formal sector data. Sixteen major states of India 








Table 2: Regressions on formal productivity   22 
Variables  OLS pooled 
regression 




Formal wage  0.94    1.14  3.04*     
Informal wage    6.63*      11.8***  12.1*** 
Openness Index  3372  2640  3429  1327  1990  2423 




















th Report) for informal sector data. Sixteen major states in India have been considered. 
Year = 1989-90, 1994-95, 2000-01. Openness Index of the states is taken from Marjit et 
al. (2007).  
Note: * represents significant at 10% level, ** represents significant at 5%, *** 
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